Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)

1968

Wally's Wagon, Inc. v. State Tax Commission of
Utah : Defendant's Brief
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machinegenerated OCR, may contain errors.Henry L. Adams, Esq; Attorney for Defendant, State Tax
CommissionCannon and Duffin; Attorneys for Plaintiff
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Wally's Wagon v. Utah Tax Comm'n, No. 11155 (Utah Supreme Court, 1968).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/86

This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
WALLY'S WAGON, INC.
a corpora tion,

Plaintiff,
Case No.

-vs.-

11155

STATE TAX COMMISSION
OF UTAH,

Defendoot.

DEFENDANT'S BRIEF
Review of a Decision of the Utah State Tax Commission

PHIL L. HANSEN
Attorney General
HENRY L. ADAMS
Assistant Attorney General
236 State Capitol
~t ~ke City, Utah

rAttrnef.s for E e 1 '

CANNON AND DUFFIN
619 Continental Bank Building

Sa~t~~!:Y~i;~~ ~i!titt

-

JUN l O 1968

----·c;,~-.i··5~;~~-;;;-e~ri;-ut;;;-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
l'lllNTSD •V •ALT LAICll' TIMS•

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
Statement of the Nature of the Case ---------------------- I
Disposition Before the Utah State Tax
Commission -----------------------------------------------------------· 2
Relief Sought on Appeal -----------··-·-·--····-···---------··-··-·-2
Statement of Facts -----···-···-·-···-········--···--···--·---·--··-·--·2
Argument ------····-·------···-·----·-··-··-··-···--···-····----------------···
4
Point I.
PLAINTIFF'S APPEAL SHOULD BE
DISMISSED SINCE IT FAILED TO COMPLY WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF
THE STATUTE ESTABLISHING THE
RIGHT TO APPEAL. ------------------···-··-······---------·· 4
Point II.
THE PLAINTIFF IS A RETAILER REQUIRED TO COLLECT AND PAY OVER
TOTHESTATEALLSTATEANDLOCAL
SALES TAXES IMPOSED BY LAW UPON
RETAIL SALES.--·-··--····-···----------··--------------------------7
Point III.
NEITHER THE UTAH STATE SALES
TAX ACT NOR THE REGULATORY PRO1

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Page
VISIONS PROMULGATED THEREUNDER PROHIBIT COLLECTION BY THE
PLAINTIFF ON THE STATE AND LOCAL
SALES TAX ............................................................ 13
Conclusion .................................................................... 17
Authorities Cited
Abt v. Department of Revenue, 34 Ill. 2d 324
215 N.E.2d 243 (1966) ...................................... 12
Christean v. Industrial Comm'n, 113 Utah 451,
196 P.2d 502 ( 1948) ........................................ 8, 11

Cassidy v. Peters, 50 W ash.2d 115, 309 P2d 767
12, 13
(1957) ···························································
Hinckley, Inc. v. State Tax Comm'n, 17 Utah 2d
270, 404 p .2d 622 ( 1965) .................................... 13

W. F. Jensen Candy Co. v. State Tax Comm'n,
90 Utah 359, 61 P.2d 629, 107 A.L.R. 261
(1936) ······-····················································
14
Lambert v. State Tax Comm'n, 16 Utah 2d 159,
397 P.2d 294 (1964) ······································-6
Nicholson v. Industrial Comm'n, 14 Utah 2d 3,
9
376 p .2d 386 ( 1962) ··-·--··-······-·····-····-·····-----····Ogozalek v. Administrator, Unemployment Compensation Act, 28 Conn. Sup. 100, 163 Atl. 114
(1960) ·······································-···················
12
Pacific Intermountain Express Co. v. State Tax
Com'n, 7 Utah 2d 15, 316 P.2d 549 (1957) .... 5
Stover Bedding Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 99 Utah
423, 107 P.2d 1027 (1940) ---·····················-·········
9
11

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Page
Thoikol Chem. Corp. v. Peterson, 15 Utah 2d 355,

393 P.2d 391 (1964) ............................................

9

Statutes
Repl. Vol. Utah Code Ann.
§ 59-15-4 (1963) ··················································
7

Repl. Vol. Utah Code Ann.
§ 59-15-5 (1963) ··················································
7

Repl. Vol. Utah Code Ann.

§ 59-15-16 (1963} ..............................................

4

Treatises
Restatement, Agency .................................................. 8

111

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

WALLY'S ,,~AGON, INC.
a corporation,

Plaintiff,

-vs.STATE TAX
OF UTAH,

CO~U.lISSION

Case No.
11155

Defendant.

DEFENDANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is a proceeding to review a determination of
the Utah State Tax Commission made against the plaintiff. Following an audit and examination report dated
.June 15, 1966 (R.113-117), the Utah State Tax Commission through its auditing division determined that during
the period May, 1964, through March, 1966, the plaintiff
was subject to the applicable state and local sales taxes.
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DISPOSITION BEFORE THE UTAH STATE TAX
COMMISSION
Both an informal and formal hearing were held·
before the Utah ~:Hate Tax Commission, and in November, 1967, the commission issued its decision No. 260
determining that the plaintiff was subject to the taxes
as alleged. This decision 'Was subsequently amended on
December 28, 1967; however, no change was made in the
ultimate determination of liability by the commission.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
rrhe plaintiff seeks to have the determination of the
Utah State Tax Commission that it was subject to the
state and local sales taxes for the period involved reversed. The defendant seeks to have the decision upheld.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The defendant accepts generally the plaintiff's statement of facts; however, a few additional matters might
be mentioned. The plaintiff makes reference to a
general statement of the plaintiff's which was read into
the record (R. 60-62) and rather intimates that the
defendant accepts these facts more or less as a stipulation
since no objeetion was raised to its being read into the
record. This statement was presented only in the interest
of saving time and as a condensed reprnsentation of
plaintiff's interpretation of the matters contained there-

2
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in. At no time did the defendant stipulate that it would
accept all of the matters contained in the statement as
binding on it.
Contrary to the contention of the plaintiff, it is
believed that all regulations and rulings in the possession
of the defendant were continuously made available to it
and, if they were not furnished, would have been furnished had they been requested. With respect to the
advertisement seeking boys to operate the ice cream
vehicles, there is some confusion and question that he
advertised for independent contractors since he indicated
that his ad was placed under a eiolumn of either salesmen
or help wanted. (R.77) ·while it appears that the plaintiff
did not advertise by conventional media such as newspaper ads, billboards or radio, the use of motor vehicles
having musical devices and bearing signs prominently
displaying the name of plaintiff constituted a form of
advertisement. And, this advertisement brought attention
only to the plaintiff. (R.75) There was nothing to indicate a separateness between the plaintiff and the operator of the vehicle, and it was the distinct intention to
have identity of the vehicle and operator related solely
to the plaintiff.
Finally, while the plaintiff did not solicit retail sales
through the conventional means mentioned above, it did
solicit retail sales by having its trucks traverse the
streets of the county playing music and offering sale of
its confections to county residents.

3
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
PLAINTIFF'S APPEAL SHOULD BE DISMISSED
SINCE IT FAILED TO COMPLY WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF TT-IE STATUTE ESTABLISHING
THE RIGHT ri:io APPEAL.
The defendant would greatly like to bring this
matter back to the attention of the court, at least briefly,
realizing that memoranda have been filed previously
and that oral arguments have been held. Since, however,
the court did not enter a written decision setting forth
the ha.sis on which the writ of certiorari was allowed,
although the statutory requirements had not been complied with, the defendant feels that it and the taxpaying
public should be advised of the basis of the court's
determination. This is necessary to insure uniform enforcement of the law as to all taxpayers and to enable
the administrative body to seek such legislative relief as
it deems necessary if it is the opinion of the court that
the statute is for some reason unconstitutional.
The applicable statutory provision is Repl. Viol. Utah
Code Ann. §59-15-16 1963:
Before making application to the Supreme
Court for a writ, the full amown-t of the taxes,
interest and other charges audited and stated in
the determination or decision of the tax commission mitst bP deposited with the tax commission
and an undertaking filed with the tax commission
in such amount and with such surety as the tax
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commission shall prove [sic] to the effect that if
such writ is dismissed or the decision of the tax
commission affirmed, the applicant for the writ
will pay all costs and charges which may accrue
against him in the prosecution of said case; or at
the option of the applicant, such undertaking may
be in a sum sufficient to cover the taxes, interest
and other charges audited and stated in such decision, plus the co·sts and charges which may
accrue against him in the prosecution of such
case, in which event, the applicant shall not be
required to pay such taxes, interest and other
charges as a condition precedent to his application
for the writ. (Emphasis added.)
There is no contention by either party that the plaintiff has complied with this provision.
\Vithin the past few years this court in two cases
has considered matters brought before it involving the
Utah State Tax Commission wherein appeal was sought
to be taken without the party availing itself of the exclusive means of review provided by the sales tax statute.
In Pacific Intennountain Express Co. v. State Tax
Comni'n, 7 Utah 2d 15, 316 P.2d 549 (1957) the taxpayer
sought to appeal from the district court to the Utah
Supreme Court. Sales tax had been as,sessed against the
taxpayer which taxpayer felt was unlawful and sought
to have it declared so in the lower ciourt. In a unanimous
decision, after considering several cases and the statutory
provision involved, this court held:

It is our conclusion that the trial court correctly dismissed the action for the reason ~hat t~e
procedure set forth in the Sales Tax Act itself is

5
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the exclusive method of seeking redress from the
sales tax assessment. This obviates our consideration of the validity of the tax 7 Utah 2d 15 20
.
' '
316, P.2d 549, 552.
Then, in 1964, the court issued its decision in
Lambert v. State Tax Conim'n, 16 Utah 2d 159, 397 P.2d
294. There, the taxpayer sought to compel in the district
court action by a representative of the Utah State Tax
Commission. The district court granted the taxpayer the
relief sought. On appeal by the Utah State Tax Commission this court again unanimously held that the decision must be reversed since the taxpayer did not comply
with the exclusive requirements of the use tax act. The
court stated:
·whether Mr. Lambert's remedy under Chapter
16, U.C.A.1953, known as the Use Tax Act was exclusively to exhaust his administrative remedies
and seek review of the Commission's decision in
this court or whether the remedies provided under
the provisions of Sec. 59-16-23 of that Act are
available to him need not be determined in the
instant case. Under all the provisions of the Use
Tax Act before recourse can be had to either this
court or the district court for relief from a use
tax assessment there must either be deposited with
the Commission the amount assessed or payment
made under protest. Here it is clear this action
was brought to avoid these conditions precedent
to recourse to the courts. The court therefore
erred in ordering the issuance of license plates
and registration of the vehicle involved.
This court has held, therefore, that where the Legislature has established exclusive means of review of the

6
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

determinations and deC'isions made by the Utah State
Tax Commission sud1 means of review must be followed.
The defendant would agree that arbitrary or capricious
adion by it may obviate the necessity of following these
statutorily established means of review, but there has
been no showing here of sud1 arbitrariness or capriciousness. (R. 131-146)
It would appear, then, that under the statute and
the decisions of this court, plaintiff is not entitled to
prosecute this appeal until it has 0omplied with the conditions precedent set forth in the statute. Because of the
statute and past court decisions, the defendant feels
compelled to ask the court to reconsider its determination
in which it permitted this appeal or, at least, to advise
it and the public generally in a written decision the basis
on which it determined that a taxpayer can appeal a
determination of the Utah State Tax Commission without
complying with the conditions preC'edent of the statute.

POINT II
THE PLAINTIFF IS A RETAILER REQUIRED TO
COLLECT AND PAY OVER TO THE STATE ALL
STATE AND LOCAL TAXES IMPOSED BY LA"\V
UPON RETAIL SALES.
Repl. Vol. U tab Code Ann. § 39-15-5 ( 1963) requires
the collection of a sales tax by the vendor on every retail
sale, and Repl. Vol. Utah Code Ann. § 59-15-4 (1963)
establishes the rate of the tax imposed. Contrary to the
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contention of the plaintiff that the operators of the ice
cream vehicles were independent contractors, the defendant determined that said individuals were either agents
or employees of the plaintiff; that the retail sales were
made by the plaintiff; and, that the plaintiff was required
to collect and pay over the applicable tax.
This court in several cases has been required to
determine the nature of the relationship between individuals; i.e., principal-agent, employer-employee, master-servant, or independent contractor. Though none of
these cases seem to have been concerned with an individual's liability for sales tax, these ca.ses, nevertheless,
seem to be so similar as to be controlling in this i·ssue.
In Christean v. Industrial Commission, 113 Utah 451,
196 P. 2d 502 (1948), the court reviewed the case authorities and considered, particularly, the tests which have
been set forth in the Restatement, Agency, sec. 220, which
provides:
(1) A servant is a person employed to perform
service for another in his affairs and who, with
respect to the physical conduct in the performance of the service, is subject to the other's
control or right to control.
(2) In determining whether one acting for another is a servant or an independent contractor,
the following matters of fact, among others, are
oonsidered:
a. The extent of control which, by the agreement, the master may exercise over the details
of the work;

8
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. b. wl:et_her or not. the employee is engaged
m a d1stmct occupation or business·

'

c. the kind of occupation, with reference fo
whether in the locality, the work is usually done
und~r ~he ~irection of the employer or by a
specialist without supervision;
d. the skill reqnired in the particular occupation;
e. whether the employer ·Or the workman
supplies the instrumentalities, tools, and the
place of work for the person doing the work;
f. the length of time for which the person is
employed;
g. the method of payment, whether by the
time or by the job;
h. whether or not the ·work is a part of the
regular business of the employer;
i. whether or not the parties believe they
are creating the relationship of master and
servant; and
j. whether the principal is or is not engaged
in business.

Under the Restatement and the Utah case law, the
important criterion for determining whether there i·s a
relationship of master and servant is whether there is
a right to control the manner in which the work is accomplished, whether or not such control is exerdsed.
Thiokol Chemical Corp. v. Peterson, 15 Utah 2d 355, 393
P. 2d 391 (1964); Nicholson v. Industrial Commission,
14 Utah 2d 3, 376 P. 2d 386 (1962); Stover Bedding Co·. v.
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Industrial Cornmission, 99 Utah 423, 107 P. 2d 1027
(1940).
In the instant case it would appear that the taxpayer
had the right to control the activities of the drivers and
that he did exercise such rights. The plaintiff was responsible fo1 the care and maintenance of the motor
vehicles; the plaintiff established areas in which the
drivers were to operate; the plaintiff regulated the hours
during which they were to "·ork and could determine
which of the drivers would work on any particular occasion; the plaintiff furnished ihe goods to be sold and
restricted the drivers to the sale of his products only, set
the price of these products and determined the commission to be paid each of the drivers. The employment was
terminable at will by the plaintiff and the plaintiff, in
reality, did not sell merchandise to the drivers each day
but provided them with the merchandise and paid them
a portion of the gross receipts on the Tuesday following
the end of the weekly period.
These factors strongly indicate that the drive:r:s were
not independent contractors but were employees of the
plaintiff.

It is noted that the agreement is entitled as one for
the lease of the motor vehicle ancl it is specifically provided that the drivers are independent contractors. \:Vhile
effect is normally given to the designation of the ciontracting parties, a legal relationship of independent
contractor does not arise simply by calling it such and if
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the factors indicate that another telationship exists, the
agreement will be treated as such.
·where parties in good faith contract as to a
status and the understanding arrived at is niot
contrary to the law as it is then announced, the
intent of the parties as set forth in such a contract
can be considered as an element in determining
the relationship of the parties and can be given
weight by the Commission and this court. Such a
provision in a contra~t has the effect of negating
an intent on the part of the master to retain control and an intent on the part of the agent to yield
contr.ol. However, the weight to be given this factor may be inconsequential if the other terms of
the contract are such that by peering through •the
mask of contract phraseology it can be reasonably
determined the contract was merely a guise to
conceal the true relationship. Christean v. Industrial Commission, supra.
·
We must look to the substance rather than the
form of a transaction, and the categorization
given to a relationship by the interested parties is
not conclusive of the nature of the relationship.
There, an agreement between the taxicab company
and the drivers specifically provided that no
employer-employee relationship existed between
the parties. In holding that the cab company was
liable for contributions under the Unemployment
Compensation Act, we stated that despite the
negation of an employer-employee relati onship in
the agreement there was sufficient exercise of
control over the drivers to justify a finding of
employment status under the Employment Com.
pensation Act. True, "employment " was specifically defined in that act, but the ultimate
determination came from the totality of the cir1
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cumstances surrounding the transactions. Abt v.
Dept. of Revenue, 34 Ill. 2d 324, 215 N. E. 2d 243
(1966).
See also Cassidy v. Peters, 50 Wash. 2d 115, 309 P.
2d 767 ( 1957). There have been several recent cases
similar to the instant case in which ice cream was
vended by means of motorized drivers. In Abt v. Dept.
of Revenu.e, supra, the court pointed particularly to the
facts that the taxpayer owned the vehicles used, that he
supplied the gas and obtained the licenses and registration for the vehicles, that the vehicles were stored at bis
place of business, that the drivers were paid a commission on the amount sold and that he as.signed the drivers
to designated territories. The court held that this constituted a relationship of employer-employee and that the
taxpayer rather than the drivers was subject to the
Illinois sales tax.
In Ogozalek v. Adminstrator, Unemployment Compensation Act, 28 Conn. Sup. 100, 163 Atl. 2d 114 (1960),
the court again held that the drivers of ice cream vending
trucks were employees. There the employer owned five
trucks with his name printed on each, and the price of
the ice cream was listed on each of the trucks. The employer repaired, serviced and maintained the trucks,
obtained insurance and licenses for them, and paid for all
gas and oil used. The drivers ·were furnished with a
uniform and furnished with cash each day for the purpose
of making change. The employer assigned each of the
drivers to a specific territory and paid them their portion
of the proceeds at the end of each week. These factors
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were held to evidence sufficient control to create a relationship of empl•oyer-employee.
Also, in Cassidy v. Peters, supra, the ice cream
vendors were considered to be employees. The operative
fads were similar to those in the above cited cases and
in the instant case.

POINT III
THE UTAII STATE SALES TAX ACT
NOR THE REGULATORY PROVISIONS PROMULGATED THEREUNDER PROHIBIT COLLECTION
BY THE PLAINTIFF ON THE APPLICABLE
STATE AND LOCAL SALES TAX.
~EITHER

In order to facilitate the collection of state and local
sale's tax by vendors, the Utah State Tax Commission
enacted regulation S6 which established a bracket system
of oollection. In other words, sales between certain
amounts were deemed to require a tax of a certain
amount, and the scale was graduated as to the amount of
sales. This bracket system imposed no tax on sales which
were between the amounts 10f zero to fourteen cents. Apparently, the taxpayer is contending that since its sales
were less than fifteen cents in each instance it was not
required to collect the sales tax because of thi,s bracket
system. The defendant feels that this contention has been
adequately resolved in a decision of thi,s court, Hinckley,
Inc. v. State Tax Comm'n, 17 Utah 2d 70, 404 P. 2d 622
(1965). This court there considered several aspects of

13
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the sales tax provisions, its imp()sition, and duty of collection. With respect to the duty of the vendor to collect
the tax, the court stated:
. : . . The legislature by eliminating the prov1s10n that the vendor had the option of collecting
from the vendee or abs()rbing the tax himself if
lie saw fit, did not change the nature of the t~x
which is still one imposed on the transaction. It i~
still mandatory for the vendor to assume the responsibility for the collection, accounting and
remitting of the amounts due the State on the
transactions.
A·s to the nature of the tax, the court made relation
to its decision in W. F. Jens en Candy Co. v. State Tax
Cornm'n, 90 Utah 359, 61 P. 2d 629, 107 A.L.R. 261
(1936):
... this court pointed out that the tax imposed
is a tax on a transaction, and unless there is an
exemption there is still due the State the rate
imposed on such transaction whether it be a cent
or one-fifth of a cent. The fact that in sales of less
than 50 cents the collection of the tax may be difficult does not change the responsibility of the
vendor for the collection and accounting to the
State for the tax imposed.
Then, the court further stated:
The tax imposed is upon the transaction, and its
payment to the State is not dependent upon how
it is collected. The rate is constant and applies
alike to every seller. The ,seller is required to remit
the amount due on total sales. If he chooses to sell
items which are priced at a point on the schedule
where less than the full tax can be collected, be
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cannot complain that the :,;cherlule is discriminatory as to him because no provision has been made
hy the Tax Commission whereby the correct
amount due from the purchaser under his method
of doing business can he collected. The schedule
applies alike to every seller and aids those whose
method of doing hus;ncss makes its application
practical by facilitating the collection of the correct amount required by the seller to be remitted
to the State 011 its local sales.
As to the fact that the sales made by Hinckley were
generally less than the minimum amount set forth in the
bracket system, the court made this observation:
That Hinckley has chosen a method of doing
business through vending machines which makes
it impossible for it to collect the tax under the
"bracket system" does not deprive it of equal
protection of the laws nor is it deprived of its
prnperty ~without due process. The tax imposed is
upon the transaction, and its payment to the State
is not dependent upon whether it is collected or
whether the consumer pays it. The rate remains
constant and applies alike to every vendor. Because a vendor chooses to sell only articles at a
price on which no tax can be collected under the
"bracket system" does not make the system discriminatory nor arbitrary. It may be that the
''bracket system'' should not apply to such a
vendor if he can devise a rneans of collecting the
correct amount of the tax, but that does not mean
that if he cannot devise such a means that as tio
him the tax is unlawful.
And, then:
Our attention has not been called to any provision of our Sales Tax Act which forbids the

15
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collcctiou of the correct amount due from a purchaser regardless of the fact that the consideration is so small that there is no coin of the realm
that can be used. Nor has our attention been ealleu
to any provision of our Sales Tax Act which
makes it unlawful or prohibits a vendor from
absorbing or paying the tax himself, if he so
chooses. It does not necessarily follow from the
fact that the 1937 amendment deleted the provis10n that the vendor had the option of collecting
from the vendee or absorbing the tax himself that
the legislature intended to prohibit or make it
unlawful for a vendor to abs,orb or pay the tax
himself. The Aet still provides that the tax shall
be collected and that the vendor is responsible for
its collection and must remit the correct amount
due from its total sales for the remitting period.
-we cannot ascribe to the legi·slature an intent to
make it impossible for a vendor to conform with
its requirements.

Finally, this court took specific note of the fact that
the bracket system of collection was not the only method
of collection of the tax imposed by the statute and could
not be used exclusively by the administrativ.e agency.

It follows from what we have said that as to
busine.sses where all sales are for less than the
amount in which the "bracket system" pr1ovid€s
for collection of the tax from the vendee, the
''bracket system'' provided by the Tax Commission docs not eonf orm to the Act which imposes
the tax on the transaction and requires the vendor
t;o collect the tax from the vendee. As to such
businesses, the "bracket system," promulgated
by the Tax Commission, of collectin~ the t~xes by
the vendor need not be the only device which can

16
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be used by a vendor. ... Such a regulation obviously is not in harmony with the Act which
requires the collertion of the tax, yet makes it
impossible for a vendor to charge fractional parts
of a cent for items sold; for instance 9 and 7/10
cents as consideration for the sale and 3/10 cent
for sales tax, thereby making it possible, if he
desires to use that device, to collect the tax from
the vendee. After all, the ''bracket system'' is only
a device which would make it pos·sible for vendors
to collect approximately the correct amount of the
tax which they are required to remit on their
transactions. lVhere the "bracket system" device
is impractical because it cannot serve such a
purpose, a vendor should not be precluded from
using some other means, since the clear intent of
the law is the collection of approximately the
correct amount from vendees and the remitta;nce
by vendors of the tax due Mi total value of transactions.
The defendant contends that under this case and
its underlying reasoning that the state and local sales
tax must be imposed and that a regulatory bracket system
is only directive and is set forth only for the assistance
of the vendor. It does not relieve the retailer of his responsibility to collect the tax on each retail sale. The
plaintiff, therefore, as a retailer wa.s required to collect
the state and local sales taxes although he may have
considered himself exempt under the bracket system.
CONCLUSION

The defendant contends first that this court should
not entertain this appeal smce the plaintiff failed to
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oomply with the conditions precedent clearly set forth
in the ·sales tax ·statute, which provisions this court has
heretofore upheld. Additionally, the arrangement be.
tween the plaintiff and the operators of the motor
vehicles was clearly not one of an independent contractor,
but more closely it:sembling that of either a principal.
agent or employer-employee. It seems inconceivable that
these young boys could be treated as independent contractors where the plaintiff exercised such a degree of
control and supervision and where their concept of the
relationship was Qnly that of selling ice cream.
As the cases all indicate, the characterization aecorded to an agreement by the parties is not controlling
and this would be particularly so where the contract
itself was drafted by an individual dealing primarily with
young men who have not even yet reached the age of
majority. Finally, the contention that the plaintiff eiould
not collect the sales tax because he is prohibited by
statute is wholly untenable. This court in its own decision
has demonstrated that it could collect the tax and there
is no provision in either the statute or the regulation
which would have prohibited the collection of the tax.
Therefore, it is submitted that the decision of the Utah
State Tax Commission should be upheld.
Respectfully submitted,

PHIL L. HANSEN,
Attorney General
HENRY L. ADAMS,
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Defendant
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